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ARTICLES
BASIC PROTECTION AND THE FUTURE
OF NEGLIGENCE LAW*
Robert E. Keeton**
C OMING to full flower only in the nineteenth century,' negligence law
is still a tender young plant among the hardy redwoods of legal
history. Yet the jeopardy in which it stands is due not to its youth but to
its aging inflexibility-to its failure to adapt to the era of the automobile.
This is not to say that its end is at hand. Rather, a future of some kind
for negligence law seems assured. The questions in doubt are what kind and
for how long. The surest way of causing it to be inglorious and brief is to
continue to ask more of this body of law than it can deliver, particularly
in relation to compensating traffic victims.
I. MEASURING THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM BY SOUND OBJECTIVES
What objectives should a good set of laws for compensating traffic victims
serve?
First, it should be aimed not simplistically at compensating but more
*This article is based in large part on talks before the National Conference of Bar
Presidents at the mid-winter meeting in Chicago, February 16, 1968, and before a clinic
sponsored by the Central Carolinas Chapter of the Chartered Property and Casualty
Underwriters on February 14, 1968. I gratefully acknowledge also that in preparing the
article I have drawn heavily on materials previously prepared in collaboration with
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell of the University of Illinois, including BASIC PROTECTION FOR
THE TRAFFIC VicT-m-A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965)
[hereinafter cited as BASIC PROTECTION] and AFTER CARS CRAsH-THE NEED FOR
LEGAL AND INSURANCE REFORM (1967) [hereinafter cited as AFTER CARs CRASH].
**Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.B.A., University of Texas, 1940; LL.B.,
University of Texas Law School, 1941; S.J.D., Harvard Law School, 1956.
1 E.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); Vincent v. Stinehour, 7
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sensitively at compensating fairly. That is, it should determine both entitle-
ment to compensation and liability for compensation on principles that are
fair and just. There are differences about implementation no doubt, but
surely a consensus on this objective.
Second, a good set of laws should offer reasonable assurance of financial
responsibility for paying the compensation determined to be legally owing.
Up through the nineteenth century the common law did very little about
this. Today, in contrast, every state legislature has enacted some form of
financial responsibility legislation.2 Thus it appears we now have a con-
sensus on this objective, too.
Third, a good set of laws for compensating traffic victims ought to distrib-
ute losses to some extent rather than imposing catastrophic burdens on indi-
viduals, whether victims or defendants. Perhaps a few will dissent here,
but the history of state legislation encouraging the purchase of liability
insurance, and sometimes even compelling it, is not to be explained solely
as a movement for assuring financial responsibility. That objective could
have been served by bonds or policies under which the bondsman or insurer,
having paid a victim, was always entitled to recover in turn from the tort-
feasor. Instead liability insurance pays on behalf of the tortfeasor. In short,
liability insurance distributes losses. Its prevalence manifests a consensus for
a system of distribution and against a system involving crushing individual
burdens, whether upon victims or upon tortfeasors.
Fourth, a good set of laws ought not only to distribute but also, in the
process, to allocate fairly the cost of compensating for injuries in traffic
accidents. This objective is, in a sense, a corollary of the first objective of
compensating fairly. It is simply a somewhat more specific development of
that point. Here, too, there may be differences about implementation, but
surely not about the objective.
Fifth, a good set of laws ought to operate with reasonable efficiency,
minimizing waste.
Sixth, a good set of laws ought to minimize inducements to exaggeration
and fraud.
Seventh-and I place this so late in the catalogue of objectives because
there is more dissent about it, not because it occupies this place in my own
order of priorities, in which rather it comes alongside providing fair and
just compensation-a good set of laws ought to provide its payments
promptly to meet the resulting economic burdens as they occur and to
provide medical and other rehabilitative services as soon as they are needed.
Vt. 62 (1835); see 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 748-52 (1956).
2 BAsic PROTECTION 76-109.
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How well does the common law of negligence serve these seven objec-
tives?
Measured against the first objective, the present system fails even to do
well. in compensating, much less in compensating fairly. It pays nothing
to some deserving traffic victims and too little to others. It underpays
especially the most severely injured persons, if it pays them at all.3 More-
over, among these are the most deserving of all traffic victims. In contrast,
as field studies in state after state demonstrate, it overpays victims with
minor injuries.4
The present system also distributes unfairly the burden of costs resulting
from accidental losses. We can predict the number of accidents and the toll
of losses that will occur on roads of the quality we choose to provide,
crowded with cars in the numbers we choose to operate, in the hands of
drivers we choose to license. It is not alone carelessness of individual op-
erators that produces these accidents. In the phrase of Professor Galabresi,
we have made a "decision for accidents" of this order of magnitude by
choosing not to spend more for safer roads and not to give up the many
advantages we gain from using so many vehicles and licensing drivers so
freely.5 In reality, then, part of the cause of the accident toll is the set of
community choices about roads and vehicles and drivers. The law, too,
should attribute part of the accident toll to these choices. That is, it should
place part of the burden on the whole group who benefit from these choices,
and it should distribute the burden, to the extent it is feasible to do so,
in proportion to the benefits derived from motoring of this degree of inten-
sity. In this sense, motoring should pay its way in our society.6 Moreover,
insurance is a mechanism through which it is quite feasible to distribute
this burden widely and fairly. Under the present system, in contrast, motor-
3 A thorough documentation of this point appears in CONARD, MORGAN, PRATT, VOLTZ
& BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS-STUDIES IN THE ECO-
NOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964) [hereinafter cited as CONARD et al.]. See, e.g., id.
at 179, 196-98, 222, 250. See also the additional studies cited in note 4 infra.
4 See, e.g., CONARD et al., HUNTING & NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEw YORK CITY? A
STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS (1962); Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact
of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962); Franklin, Chanin & Mark,
Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation,
61 COLUss. L. REv. 1 (1961); James & Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims:
A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B. J. 70 (1952); COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO
STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932). The findings of these
studies are summarized in BASIC PROTECTION 34-69
5 Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965).
6 See BASIC PROTECTION 256-72, for a more extended development of this point.
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ing and motorists generally escape a large part of accident costs. It is im-
posed instead on the unlucky persons who are the victims of uncompensated
loss.
Second, the present system falls well short of the objective of assuring
financial responsibility for payment of the benefits it declares to be due.
Countrywide, it is a fair estimate even today that somewhere between
ten and fifteen percent of the cars on our highways are uninsured for
coverage that would pay victims injured by their operation. 7 Moreover, the
persons operating these cars tend to be the less responsible drivers, causing
a disproportionate percentage of injuries. It is true that through uninsured
motorist coverage and like devices the percentage of wholly uncompensated
injuries is sharply reduced. But provisions of this kind are almost always
subject to low limits, besides being very unfair in that they make the wrong
people bear the burden of losses even within the limits.8
Third, the present system falls even further short of the objective of
distributing loss to avoid catastrophic burdens on individuals. Financial
irresponsibility itself accounts in part for this failure because it leaves legally
deserving victims of severe injury uncompensated and thus under crushing
economic burdens. In addition, the present system leaves many other vic-
tims uncompensated because of its harsh rules for determining who are the
legally deserving victims-its rules, for example, against allowing any com-
pensation at all in cases of unavoidable accident and contributory fault.
Who among us can defend as a work of justice the denial of compensation
to the pedestrian who is struck on the sidewalk by a car out of control as
the result of a so-called unavoidable accident, occurring when an apparently
healthy driver suffers an unpredictable heart attack?
The last illustration is one of many that mark the present system as a
failure under the fourth objective also-the objective of allocating fairly
the costs of injuries sustained in traffic accidents. Moreover, the proposition
that motoring should pay its way is relevant to this as well as to the first
objective of compensating fairly. Not until much greater recognition is
given to this proposition will the unfair allocation of the burden of accident
losses be corrected.
Fifth, the present system is wasteful, requiring an annual fortune in tax
dollars to support the trial of claims of traffic victims, and requiring too
that motorists maintain a form of insurance so inefficient that it delivers net
7 The estimated percentage of uninsured vehicles varies widely among states and
among estimators and probably continues to grow smaller. Concerning published esti-
mates that about 85 per cent of the nation's vehicles were insured in 1959 and 1960,
see BASIC PROTECTION 65-66.
8 S e BASIC PROTECTION 67.
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benefits of less than forty-five cents for each dollar of premiums paid' inP
Sixth, the present system has built-in inducements to exaggeration and
even outright fraud that add both to its unfairness and to its wasteful costs.
It lends itself on the one hand to an appalling percentage of shoot-the-
moon, go-for-broke claims and on the other hand to bargaining on distress
in defense. As the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts put
it, describing the claims side of this picture in a message to the legislature
in 1966, "too many motorists view our present insurance system as a treasure
trove to be exploited whenever one is 'fortunate' enough to be involved in
an accident." '0 The effects of the other side of this dismal picture-the
hard-bargaining defense the system inherently encourages-is summarized
in the report of Professor Conard and his colleagues at Michigan, telling
us that "the man who has a severe injury is likely to settle for it quickly
only if he settles for a relatively small amount." 11
This last point is perhaps the most severe manifestation of the failure
of the present system to meet the seventh objective-prompt payments.
Payments are delayed, however, not only in these severe cases but also in
cases of less severe injury. Indeed, any system of compensation that depends
typically on one lump-sum settlement of each claim will commonly make
its payments too late, even when it is operating at its best and the delay
is only weeks or months. At its worst, with delays of years, 2 it cruelly
aggravates the hardships inevitably produced by injury because the payments
are delayed so long that they cannot serve the important needs they are
designed in theory to serve.
II. TAILORING REFOR1M TO THE NEED
These severe shortcomings are the symptoms of a system that cannot
survive. Fundamental change is imperative.
A number of responsible and'thoughtful people have urged the abolition
of jury trials in all automobile accident cases. Among them are some who
urge also that we shift responsibility for this problem from the states to
the federal government by adopting a national compensation plan for auto-
9 See, e.g., CONARD et al., supra note 4, at 8, 60 & n.82, 61.
I0 This passage from the Governor's 1966 message is quoted in an article by Chris-
topher Lydon, reviewing the debate on automobile insurance reform, Boston Globe, Aug.
25, 1967, at 13.
11 CONARD et al., supra note 4, at 222.
12 The data are reported annually in INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE
TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION-PERSONAL INJURY JURY CASES (Calendar
Status Study). In very recent years the pressures of greatly increased criminal dockets
have exacerbated already intolerable delays in most metropolitan areas.
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mobile victims, patterned after workmen's compensation. 3 Some, too, are
urging a greater role for government and a reduced role for private insur-
ance. Preliminary investigations of the whole problem of automobile insur-
ance have already occurred in Washington, and more are promised.14
Adopting a system of government insurance, or even a national com-
pensation scheme operated mostly by private insurers, or abolishing jury
trials in all traffic injury cases would be resorting to drastic remedies that
still would not meet the need. More moderate and more suitable reform
could be accomplished now with speed but for vigorous opposition from
segments of the bar and the insurance industry-two groups that stand to
lose the most if proponents of more drastic reform have their way.
Observe the position of the insurance industry today. Whatever the truth
may be about whether insurance companies are losing or making money
on automobile insurance, it is clear they are not doing as well as they did
ten or twenty years ago, and not as well on this kind of insurance as they
continue to do even today on other kinds of insurance. As a result many
executives in the industry are trying to find ways to withdraw selectively
from the automobile liability insurance business-to pick the customers they
want and decline to write insurance for others. Inevitably, then, the number
of people who cannot get the insurance they want is growing. This failure of
the private industry to fulfill the public demand for insurance, if allowed
to continue, will leave no alternative but some form of government insur-
ance to fill the gap. Moreover, nobody can reasonably believe that govern-
ment insurance, once introduced to this field, will be limited to writing
insurance that private companies do not want to write. Thus, the most
severe and immediate threat to the insurance industry is a threat more
internal than external-a threat not that the government will move in
and take the business away from an industry that is doing its best to meet
the public demand and keep the business for itself, but rather that the indus-
try will partly move out, leaving a vacuum that must be filled by government
action. If the government must act-if it must either become the supplier
itself or else compel a recalcitrant industry to meet the need, it is not hard
to believe the former course will be the path of least resistance. If enough
leaders of the insurance industry and the bar continue to oppose change
until this fateful step is taken, the industry will be well on its -way to
losing its whole stake in the present system. And so will the bar, since any
13 Hofstadter & Pesner, A National Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident
Cases, 22 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 615 (1967).
14 See, e.g., STAFF OF HousE ANTITRUST SUBCOBIo . OF THE CONIM . ON THE JU-
DICIARY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON AUTO. INS. STUDY (1967); Turner, Auto
Insurance Facing Inquiries, New York Times, Dec. 18, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
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system of government insurance is certain to reduce drastically the role
lawyers enjoy today.
Let it be clear, though, that more moderate reform should be favored
not just because it happens to perserve a greater role for private insurance
and for lawyers, but because it would better serve the public interest than
either government insurance or the present system.
Defenders of the present system often argue that restrictive underwriting
practices (involving cancellations, non-renewals, and refusals to write cov-
erage for some classes of applicants) are an independent problem, unrelated
to the system's performance in compensating traffic victims. But the increas-
ingly restrictive underwriting of recent years has developed as an industry
response to the upward spiral of claims costs and the increasing difficulty
insurers have experienced in obtaining approval of rates they consider
adequate. Thus, to the extent that wasteful features of the present system
have contributed to the cost spiral, they have contributed also to the in-
dustry response of more restrictive underwriting. In turn, a cure for the
waste would relieve the pressures for more restrictive underwriting and facili-
tate the development of voluntary pooling or other arrangements to meet
in full the public demand that automobile insurance be available to all duly
licensed drivers.
Moreover, although in some states restrictive underwriting practices
produce more complaints than any other single evil, this is not the case
everywhere. In others areas, wastefully high insurance costs are the prime
complaint. Also, particularly in those areas that include congested metro-
politan centers, delays in trials and settlements account for much of the
dissatisfaction. Thus, the details of the system for compensating traffic vic-
tims vary from state to state, and so do the relative intensity of the different
complaints it spawns.
Despite all these variations in detail, the underlying causes of deep
trouble are built into any system founded primarily on negligence law and
liability insurance, and they are at work in every state. The central source
of the varied ills of the present system is the way -it treats the multitude
of claims that do not involve severe injury. The indictment, then, should
be leveled not at the persons operating the system-neither the lawyers nor
the insurance personnel-but at the system itself, and not at the whole system
but more specifically at that part of the system concerned with the treat-
ment of the claims based on less than severe injury-those that one might
refer to as small or medium-sized.
The importance of dealing with this central problem of the small and
medium-sized claims is driven home by data concerning the number of
1968]
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theseclaims. Countrywide, of all bodily injury claims paid by-liability insur-
ance companies on passenger car coverage in a recent-,year, approximately
89 per-cent were paid in amounts less than $2,000 per.case, 79 per cent
in amounts less than $1,000, and 62 per cent in amounts less than $500.'"
Field studies indicate that in typical settlements for amounts around
$400, the loss is often less than $100. And it commonly happens that the
net loss is still less because the bills are covered-and sometimes covered
twice or more-by other kinds of insurance. 1
6
Defenders of the present system argue that these payments above and
beyond loss are based on fault and are paid for pain and suffering. But
a liability insurance company can and usually does make a settlement with
the other person even when its policyholder thinks he was not at fault. The
reason is that it costs the company far more to defend against a small
claim than to pay it. It would cost several times as much to fight a claim
all the way through the courts as to settle it, for example, for $400. Thus,
these payments and the ballooning of insurance costs caused thereby are not
explained by the fault of the insured defendants, or the pain and suffering
of the victims, or the undue generosity of insurance companies, or even
all these things combined. Rather, this happens because every claim of a
"twinge in the back," whether real or imaginary, has a substantial nuisance
value.
Reform should be tailored to the distinctive need-tailored to change
the way .the present system treats the multitude of small and medium-
sized claims. This is the key to the Basic Protection plan.
III. CENTRAL PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC PROTECTION PLAN
Basic Protection insurance is founded on two major principles-first,
paying losses from traffic injuries up to a moderate limit regardless of fault
and, second, doing away with most negligence claims below a similar limit.
Observe the contrast between the non-fault principle of Basic Protection
and the fault principle of the present system. Today, typically, claims are
made against the other driver's insurance company, based on negligence,
seeking a lump-sum payment. This payment, if obtained, ignores-and
therefore overlaps with-reimbursement already received from other
sources, such as Blue Cross, accident and health insurance benefits, and
sick-leave pay. This offers an inducement to a claimant to realize a hand-
some cash profit-for example, by having a few x-rays he does not need
15 These estimates were calculated from data for 1962 made available by Frank
Harwayne, independent consulting actuary. Data for the most recent years are always
incomplete because of delayed settlements.
l6 See the studies cited in note 4, supra.
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and .collecting the bill several .times, as well -as adding it. to. the.-specibYls'
that are customarily multiplied in arriving at a settlement of his negligence
claim. The present system also attempts to pay dollars for virtually un-
measurable claims-which, especially in the trivial cases, often amount to
uncorroborated assertions of a "nagging headache" or a "pain in the back."
Basic Protection insurance, in contrast, applies a straight-forward, ,'non-
fault insurance principle-the one already applied in health and' accfdent
insurance, in fire insurance and even in the medical payments coverage and
collision coverage of the automobile policy itself. That is, it pays for acci-
dental losses within the defined coverage of the policy, regardless of faul.
Thus payments are typically made by one's own insurer rather than. the
"other driver's" insurer. Also, they are made month by month, as losse
occur, iather than in lump sum, and they reimburse only for net out-of-
pocket loss, which ordinarily is objectively measurable and not likely to be
a source of dispute.
The second major principle of Basic Protection is fulfilled by .a partial
exemption from liability for negligence etended to Basic Protection "H-
sureds.17 Claims based on negligence are still permitted for severe inJures,
however. That is, an iijured person can recover as he does today for
so much of his damages as are higher than $5,000 for pain and suffering
or higher than $10,000 for all other items such as medical expenses and
wage loss. Also, he can still press a claim based on negligence to recover
the first $100 of out-of-pocket loss, which Basic Protection insurance does
not pay to one who elects the standard deductible. Few people would ac-
tually choose to press these very small claims, however, once the nuisance
value incident to an added claim of pain and suffering was removed.
Moreover, those persons who wanted to be sure this first $100 of losswa]s
covered could elect to eliminate the deductible from the Basic Protectioh
insurance.
As a practical matter, then, the exemption would do away with a very
high percentage of claims against Basic Protection insureds based on negli-
gence. Since having Basic Protection insurance would be a prerequisite
to registering an automobile,18 this would mean that all but a very small
percentage of the claims for personal injuries in automobile accidents would
be handled entirely under the new Basic Protection insurance.
Basic Protection would be more efficient as well as more equitable than
the present system. It would cut sharply into the wasteful litigation of small
17 Basic Protection Insurance Act §§ 4.1-4.4, BASIC PROTECTION 323-26, 341-43. This
act vill be cited hereinafter as BPI Act.
18 BPI Act § 5.1, BASIC PROTECTION 326-27, 341-43.
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and medium-sized cases and the wasteful duplication of coverages for the
same loss.
IV. CLAIMS FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING
Even though Basic Protection insurance itself does not pay benefits for
pain and suffering, those who believe in compensation for pain and suffering
as well as economic loss are offered a better and fairer deal under the
Basic Protection plan than they get under the present system. Today,
trivially injured victims receive several times as much compensation as their
out-of-pocket losses. 19 This is justified as pain and suffering damages, but in
fact it is mostly the reflection of the nuisance value of claims growing out
of the fact that the amorphous, indefinite valuation of pain and suffering
makes every claim potentially expensive to defend. In contrast with this
overpayment for trivial injuries, those who suffer the most pain-the most
severely injured victims-receive less than their out-of-pocket losses. Few
among them receive more than a fraction of loss; thus they receive nothing
extra for their pain. The Basic Protection plan seeks to do more for the
severely injured person by guaranteeing payment of his out-of-pocket loss
up to $10,000 while preserving his right to recover in a negligence claim
for his pain and suffering damages above $5,000 and his out-of-pocket
loss above $10,000.
Moreover, one would have a choice about whether to have insurance
coverage for pain and suffering damages under the Basic Protection plan.
Today, a person is forced to pay the cost of pain and suffering damages,
whether he likes it or not, if he buys any liability insurance at all. This
is true because pain and suffering damages are part of the claims his
insurance company pays to others, not him, and it is not feasible to give
him an option. Under Basic Protection, in contrast, people could decide for
themselves whether pain and suffering damages are worth the cost.
Note, too, that the motorist could buy such optional coverage with
savings realized under Basic Protection insurance. Thus, Basic Protection
would provide a better deal for motorists and for victims generally-with
an exception, however, as to the trivially injured person who is overpaid
today, really because of the nuisance value of his claim though on the theory
of pain and suffering. He would get less under Basic Protection. That is
part of the strength of the plan. It redresses this serious inequity of the
present system.
19 See note 4, supra.
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V. COST SAVINGS UNDER BASIC PROTECTION
The increased efficiency of Basic Protection would produce savings of
two principal types. One type concerns tax dollars the public pays to pro-
vide courts for the trial of these automobile accident cases. This burden
in taxes runs even higher than the amount of the benefits delivered in tens
of thousands of the less severe cases every year. This is clearly demonstrated
by calculating the cost to the public of providing a courtroom, a judge, an
officer, a court reporter, clerks, clerical personnel, and a jury to spend
two days or more trying a case in which, as happens in a high percentage
of trials, the traffic victim wins a verdict of no more than $1,500, of which
he receives less than $1,000 above his lawyer's fees and other expenses.
Plainly the taxpayers' costs of such a trial far exceed the amount the
claimant recovers.
A second type of saving concerns insurance premium dollars. Countrywide,
policyholders are paying $2.20 in automobile liability insurance premiums
for each dollar in net benefits returned to injured persons. 20 Moreover, a
large part of the reason for this low efficiency is the cost of controversy, in-
vestigation, and negotiation concerning all the multitude of small and
medium-sized claims, together with the cost of full-dress trial in a number
that are a small percentage of the total volume of these claims but enough
to be a large percentage of court dockets.
Consider how great the savings in insurance costs can be. Under the
negligence system the endless and innumerable fights over fault and over
how much pain is "worth" are big items of expense. These are eliminated
under Basic Protection insurance. The actual cost of paying for pain
and suffering up to $5,000 is also eliminated. Since this often equals several
times the out-of-pocket losses in the smaller cases of which there are so
many, this means a very substantial saving. Also Basic Protection does not
duplicate payments made from other sources such as sick leave or Blue Cross.
In contrast, a tremendous amount of waste accumulates under the present
system from the fact that payments are so often made to cover losses already
paid for. And the waste includes a heavy charge for the overhead of paying
these duplicating benefits through an insurance system. Finally, because
of deductibles, Basic Protection insurance does not pay for the first $100
of loss or 10 per cent of wage loss, whichever is greater, and this means
substantial savings. It reduces payments by these amounts and also avoids
the administrative expense and waste of having small amounts paid through
the mechanism of insurance.
The prediction of substantial savings is verified by actuarial studies.
20 See, e.g., CONARD et al., supra note 4, at 8, 60 & n.82, 61.
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Frank Harwayne of New York City, one of the most distinguished and
respected independent consulting actuaries in the United States, has con-
ducted studies of the expected impact on costs if Basic Protection were
introduced in New York2' (a state that now has compulsory liability insur-
ance) or Michigan 2 (a state that now has financial responsibility legislation
as distinguished from compulsory insurance). In both instances he con-
cluded that under the Basic Protection system costs would be substantially
less than under the negligence system, even though Basic Protection insur-
ance would pay substantially more people.
To the very limited extent that results of very extensive industry studies
of projected costs of Basic Protection have been made public,23 they indicate
that Harwayne's estimates of savings are too conservative rather than too
generous. This is not to say that industry actuaries are coming out for
Basic Protection. Rather, they seem more often to be arguing that Basic
Portection reduces payouts more than Harwayne estimates and more than
the public will approve. As for the question whether the public would find
the change an acceptable bargain, it would be helpful if the industry would
make their actuarial studies public-all of them-and let the public make
an informed judgment. In any event, industry actuaries agree that reduc-
tions in payouts mean reductions in costs as well. Indeed, sometimes they
seem to be making the point that Basic Protection would sharply reduce
total premium volume and, in turn, insurance company profits, since
profit allowances in rating standards are stated as a percentage of premium
volume.
Building in part on industry actuarial findings that Harwayne has
underestimated the extent to which insurance payments will be reduced-
for example, by eliminating payment a second time for a bill already covered
21 HARWAYNE, THE RELATIVE COST OF BASIC PROTECTION INSURANCE IN NEW YORK
STATE-AN OBJECTIVE DETERMINATION (1968); Harwayne, Insurance Cost of Automo-
bile Basic Protection Plan in Relation to Automobile Bodily Injury .Liability Costs (1966),
reprinted in 13 PROCEEDINGS, CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC'Y 122 (1966).
22 Harwayne's report of his Michigan study is being published in the UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LAW FORUM and subsequently by the University of Illinois Press in the book,
CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE (Keeton, O'Connell & McCord eds. 1968).
23 See, e.g., Wolfrum, Discussion [of Harwayne's paper], reprinted in 13 PROCEEDINGS,
CAs. ACTUARIAL SOC'Y 164 (1966). Wolfrum's comments on Harwayne's Michigan
study are being published in the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW FORUM and subsequently
by the University of Illinois Press in the book, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE (Keeton,
O'Connell & McCord eds. 1968). See also Boston Globe, Feb. 18, 1966, at 34, quoting
a spokesman for mutual insurance companies in Massachusetts as saying that studies
by the mutual companies themselves confirmed estimates that Basic Protection insurance
would produce savings of about 25 per cent for policyholders in comparison with costs
under Massachusetts' compulsory liability insuirance' system.
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by Blue Cross or other insurance-some opponents of Basic Protection per-
sist in arguing that Basic Protection reduces costs (if indeed they concede
that much) only by reducing benefits.24 In so arguing, they fail to take
account of the savings in litigation costs. Or perhaps they imply that
lawyers' fees and investigation expenses are benefits. It is interesting that
in informal discussions some insurance executives have said specifically that
from their point of view as liability insurance companies the lawyers' fees
they pay are benefits they deliver to their policyholders. But whatever
characterization they might be given from the point of view of lawyers and
insurance companies, from the point of view of the public these lawyers'
fees and other investigation and litigation costs are not benefits but are
administrative costs of a negligence and liability insurance system. A sub-
stantial part of the savings of Basic Protection are achieved by reducing
these wasteful costs, without reducing benefits to victims.
As noted before, additional savings come from eliminating that part of
small settlements that theoretically is compensation for pain and suffering
but actually is mostly a reflection of nuisance value. This can be called
a reduction of benefits, if we call anything that is paid to any victim a
benefit. But if we think of benefits as payments that meet some worthy
need, then payments for nuisance value do not deserve to be called benefits.
Similarly, duplicating payments for loss already reimbursed from Blue
Cross or medical payments coverages do not deserve to be called benefits
from this point of view. Eliminating this duplication reduces payments,
certainly, but these are reductions that serve to eliminate one of the evils
of the present system-its crass inducement to what is kindly called over-
utilization of medical coverages. Thus, these reductions in payments that
Basic Protection provides for are carefully chosen to serve not only the
purpose of reducing costs but also the purpose of redressing other short-
comings of the present system.
VI. EQurY IN INSURANCE RATES
The Harwayne studies of cost comparisons between Basic Protection and
the present system in New York and Michigan 25 concern average savings
among all policyholders within each of these states. Certainly some changes
in distribution of costs would occur, with the consequence that some policy-
24 E.g., Kemper, Automobile Insurance: The Criteria for Survival 5 (Address at mid-
winter meeting, Federation of Insurance Counsel, Feb. 2, 1968): "It can reduce costs
only in proportion to a reduction of benefits, by offering an inferior service rather than
a more efficient one. And even for the inferior service, lower cost is highly doubtful."
25 See notes 21, 22, supra.
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holders would realize greater than average savings and others less. Indeed,
one of the advantages of a reform such as Basic Protection is that it would
open the door to curing some glaring rating inequities of the present system.
A striking example of inequity today is charging identical rates to two
policyholders for whom all factors affecting probable accident involvement
are alike but whose annual earned incomes are $5,000 and $50,000 re-
spectively. To the insurance system as a whole, these two represent very
different risks because an injury causing six months of total disability pro-
duces a $2,500 wage loss in one case and a $25,000 wage loss in the other.
This is disregarded in rating plans under the present liability insurance sys-
tem, however, because the company paying the $25,000 loss is not the
high earner's own company but some other. Since payments made by a
liability insurance company ordinarily go to strangers rather than to its
own policyholder or members of his family, the companies do not charge
a higher or lower rate because of the probability of higher or lower losses
resulting from a given kind of injury. In contrast, imagine what the reaction
would be if fire insurance companies charged the same total dollar premiums
to two policyholders for full coverage of their respective houses when one's
house was worth $5,000 and the other's worth $50,000! This kind of subsidy
of high earners by low earners because the same rate is charged to both
is built into the present liability insurance rating system.
Under Basic Protection, a company would be vitally interested in the
potential earnings loss of its policyholder and members of his family, since
a large percentage of its payments would go to them rather than to others.
Thus, it would cost the company less to insure the $5,000 earner than the
$50,000 earner, and rates would quite naturally be adjusted accordingly.
The need for a very wide discrepancy between rates to achieve equity is
avoided, however, by a limitation of benefits for lost wages to a maximum of
$750 monthly.26 The high earner desiring higher coverage would pay his
added rates in purchasing voluntary coverage in excess of this amount.
It is often argued by opponents that the Basic Protection plan would
produce a converse inequity by giving commercial risks an unfair advantage.
It is said, for example, that trucks would be unfairly favored at the expense
of private passenger cars-because trucks cause more injuries to occup5ants
of cars than to occupants of the trucks and the insurers of trucks would
thus pay fewer claims under Basic Protection than they do under liability
insurance. Surely it would be inequitable to allow rates to be fixed on this
basis. But it is not necessary that such an unfair rating system be used with
Basic Protection. Rather, the tendency of trucks to cause more injuries
26 BPI Act § 2.3 (d), BAsIC PROTECTION 309.
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to occupants of other vehicles should be taken into account in fixing their
rates, and the bill filed in Massachusetts for the 1968 session provides
specifically for this to be done.2 7 It also provides for a system of equalization
among insurance companies to avoid inequity among them, for example,
in the event of disproportionate distribution among companies of the cover-
age written for truck lines2 8 It may be argued that some comparable
kind of revised rating system could be devised to correct inequities of the
present liability insurance system, and perhaps this is so. Two things seem
clear, however-first, that it is highly unlikely that such a revision of
liability insurance rating will occur in the absence of more fundamental
changes and, second, that arguments leveled against Basic Protection on
the assumption that it would be rated so as to favor such policyholders
as truck lines can be met effectively with a sensible and equitable design
of the rating system.
Another argument advanced by opponents is that Basic Protection would
disfavor policyholders who have especially good coverage of other types such
as Blue Cross and wage continuation plans because their benefits from
Basic Protection would be lower than the benefits of persons having no
such coverage of other types. This argument, too, fails to take due account
of the fact that different rates can be charged to these different types of
policyholders, and the bill filed in Massachusetts for 1968 includes specific
guidelines for rating in this way.29 As noted above, the savings predicted
in the Harwayne studies are average savings. Under a sound and equitable
rating plan, policyholders having better than average insurance of other
kinds such as Blue Cross, sick leave and wage continuation plans will
save even more. Naturally insurance companies would prefer the business
of such policyholders and, if allowed to do so, would compete for that
business by offering lower rates to those with significantly better than av-
erage coverage of other types.
Some comments are in order, too, about the horrible examples cited by
opponents in arguing that Basic Protection disfavors those with virtually
full coverage of their medical and wage losses from other sources. In the
first place, the alleged inequity under Basic Protection is completely answered
by allowing a lower rate, properly adjusted to the reduced risk (which still,
however, must include a premium appropriate to cover losses to others
covered under the policy, such as passengers and pedestrians, as well as the
possibility of excess losses to the policyholder himself). In the second
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place, an example such as that of the person who has a loss of $4,150,
receives reimbursement of $3,650 from other sources, 3 and is still allowed
to recover the full $4,150 as part of his tort claim is truly an example of
one of the things horribly wrong with the present system. The law should
not and generally does not tolerate this kind of profiteering by double
recovery for loss in fire insurance. Neither should it do so in bodily injury
insurance. It not only builds into the system terrible inducements to
exaggeration and dishonesty but also requires every honest policyholder to
pay an unnecessarily high premium to help finance all the double recoveries
-those that are exaggerated as well as those that are scrupulously honest.
It is argued, also, that because a Basic Protection insurance company
commonly pays benefits to its own policyholder and pays regardless of
fault, this system inequitably redistributes the burden of insurance premiums,
favoring bad drivers and disfavoring good drivers."' Insofar as this is a pro-
test against taking into account the extent of one's own potential loss
because of such factors as his high or low earning capacity and his good
or poor collateral source coverage, it is, as shown above, a protest against
correcting some of the inequities in rates charged for liability insurance
under the present system. For example, a driver who is good enough that
he is likely to be involved in only half as many accidents as the average
driver but whose predictable earnings loss from a given kind of injury
is ten times as high as the average ought to pay a higher than average rate
because he represents a higher than average risk to the insurance system,
even though he is a better than average driver.
Another element of the arguments opponents advance in contending
that Basic Protection would disfavor good drivers is based on the two
assumptions that bad drivers pay higher rates than good drivers under the
present system and that this would no longer be true under Basic Protection.
That is, these arguments are based on the assumptions that if benefits are
based on fault so are rates and that if benefits are not based on fault neither
are rates. In fact the criterion for benefits and the criterion for rates are
quite separable. Generally they are not the same under the present system,
and they need not be the same under Basic Protection. Under the present
system, as already noted, 2 about 62 per cent of all paid claims are closed
at amounts less than $500. Thus, most settlements are within the range
30 This example was presented in writing by Philip Magner, Esquire, at a meeting
sponsored by the Greater Buffalo Association of Insurance Agents on February 23,
1968.
31 See, e.g., Kemper, Automobile Insurance: The Criteria for Survival 5 (Address
at mid-winter meeting, Federation of Insurance Counsel, Feb. 2, 1968).
32 See text at note 15, supra.
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in which nuisance value plays a considerable role. More often than not,
a company settles even when its policyholder firmly believes he was not
at fault. Thus, it is pretense to assert that benefits under the present system
are genuinely determined by fault. If premiums for a policyholder are in-
creased just because his company has settled a claim against him, the
criterion for surcharging is not truly fault but rather involvement in an
accident that leads to a paid claim. No rating system in operation anywhere
functions on a basis of genuine determinations of fault, though some systems
aim in this direction by using rough determinations of fault in setting rates
for individual policyholders. This could be done under Basic Protection,
too. Moreover, it could be done either according to involvement leading
to payments by the policyholder's company, or instead by involvement lead-
ing to payments by another company if it were considered that this would
come closer to correlating with genuine fault. Also, it could be done on the
basis of negilgent involvement, to the extent that can truly be determined
at reasonable cost. Thus, even though benefits are paid without regard to
fault, "bad" drivers (as determined by whatever criterion one thinks fair
and just) can be charged higher rates than "good" drivers. To the extent
that it is administratively feasible to do so, rating should be done in this
way. 3
VII. PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERAGE
A new bill filed for the 1968 session in Massachusetts extends the Basic
Protection principle to damage to cars as well as injuries to people.34 Under
this bill insurance covering damage to cars would be simplified and im-
proved by replacing three separate kinds of insurance in today's policies
with one new coverage. The present coverages to be replaced are collision
coverage, property damage liability coverage, and comprehensive coverage.
Comprehensive coverage pays for such things as theft and windstorm
damage to the policyholder's car.
Collision coverage, which is carried by somewhat more than half of the
car owners in most states, pays for damage to the policyholder's own
car regardless of fault, usually subject to a deductible of $50, though one
can get collision coverage with a higher or lower deductible.
33 For one example of statutory provisions for such a rating system under Basic
Protection, see House Bill 2712, at 37 (Mass. 1968).
34 House Bill 696 (Mass. 1968). A form of bill identical in substance with this one,
and an explanation of this extension of the Basic Protection principle to damage to
vehicles, is being published in the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW FORUM~ and subse-
quently by the University of Illinois Press in the book, CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE
(Keeton, O'Connell & McCord eds. 1968).
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Property damage liability coverage pays for damage to the cars of others
negligently caused by the operation of the insured car.
If, having all these coverages, you negligently cause your car to collide
with a car owned by a person who happens to be among those (a majority)
who have collision coverage, his company pays him and (unless barred by
his contributory negligence) is then entitled to get its money back from
your company. This means that he and you have both paid premiums to
provide coverage against damage to his car, and even though only one of
the two insurance companies finally bears this loss, your premiums and his
must together pay for the overhead of two insurance companies and the
cost of their fight over which will bear this loss.
Paying for this double overhead and for these claims between companies
is a needless waste that can be avoided by applying the Basic Protection
principle. The new bill does this by setting up a single new coverage to
replace these two old coverages and also the old comprehensive coverage.
This new coverage is called Property Damage Dual Option coverage. It
protects you, first, against damage to your own car from things now
within the comprehensive coverage, such as theft and windstorm. Second,
it protects you against being held liable for damage to any car owned by
someone else. Third, it protects you against damage to your own car from
collision or upset, and in this connection you have a choice-a dual option.
Under one option-the non-fault option-you are paid for damage to your
own car regardless of fault, subject to whatever deductible you wish. Under
the other option-the fault option-you are paid for damage to your own
car only if somebody else was at fault and you were not.
The non-fault option will naturally cost more than the fault option. But
it will cost much less than you pay under the present system for comparable
benefits. The reason is that this plan eliminates most negligence claims
for damage to cars and eliminates the waste of passing money back and
forth between insurance companies, as is done today when a collision insurer
pays for the damage to a car and then tries to get its money back from
a property damage liability insurer.
The key idea of the Property Damage Dual Option coverage is the pro-
vision for mutual exemptions that do away with negligence claims for
damage to cars whenever two cars that are both covered by a non-fault
option collide. Each collects for his car damage from his own company
regardless of fault, subject to whatever deductible he elected, and that ends
the matter.
Mutual exemptions apply also to a collision between a vehicle with non-
fault coverage and one with fault coverage, but necessarily in a somewhat
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different way. For convenience, let us refer to the owner of the vehicle
with non-fault coverage as N and the owner of the vehicle with fault
coverage as F. N is paid by his insurance company, subject to his deductible,
without regard to fault, and that ends the matter as to damage to his
car. Thus Fs company has the advantage that no longer can it be sued by
N (or by N's company after it pays N and becomes subrogated) on a negli-
gence claim. To equalize matters between the companies, then, Fs company
must assume responsibility for the negligence claim of its policyholder that,
under the present system, would be made against N and his company.
Thus, since F elected the fault coverage, he can recover for damage to his
car only if he proves that N negligently caused it, and as between insurers
the burden of this claim is borne by F's company rather than N's to make
up for the fact that N's negligence claim against F and his company is elimi-
nated by the exemption. Another way of describing the situation is to say
that in this case F's company provides for F an "exempt motorist coverage"
somewhat like the uninsured motorist coverage in current policies. N is an
"exempt motorist" because of the mutual exemptions incident to his election
of non-fault coverage. Fs company no longer has the burden of meeting
negligence claims against F by N and others who have elected the non-fault
option, and to equalize the burden between companies Fs company assumes
the burden of F's negligence claims against persons in that same group.
If two vehicles that are both covered by the fault option collide, coverage
operates in exactly the same way as it does today when there is property
damage liability coverage on both vehicles and collision coverage on neither.
That is, each car owner must proceed with a negligence claim against the
other and the other's insurance company. No cost saving would result
in this instance. Thus, the cost savings effected by the Property Damage
Dual Option coverage are realized only by policyholders who today carry
collision coverage as well as property damage liability coverage.
VIII. INCENTIVES FOR SAFETY
Some opponents of Basic Protection have argued in various ways that
paying benefits without regard to fault would tend to encourage careless
driving. These arguments are based on assumptions that should be brought
into the open and examined.
In the first place, liability insurance has sharply affected whatever in-
centives to safety might be assumed to inhere in the threat of liability
based on negligence. It is hardly reasonable to expect that a driver will be
greatly concerned about the prospect that his liability insurance company
might have to bear a loss if he carelessly has an accident. Moreover, if
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drivers are sufficiently concerned about the impact of an accident on future
premiums to cause them to be safety conscious, that incentive can be used
in a system that pays benefits without regard to fault as well as in a fault-
based system. That is, whether premiums should be based on fault is com-
pletely separable from the question whether benefits should be based on
fault.35
What of the possibility that one's claim to benefits will be barred by his
own negligence? Does concern about this possibility deter carelessness?
Underlying every argument that it does is an assumption that a person's
driving habits and decisions depend to a significant extent upon his thinking
about the prospect of his being injured and about the effect of his careless-
ness on his claim. Is that assumption valid?
The typical motorist fears the consequences of bad driving, no doubt.
Probably uppermost among his concerns is fear of injury to himself or to
members of his family, fear of criminal fines for violating traffic laws, and
fear of loss of his driver's license. If the combination of these fears will
not stop him from taking unreasonable chances in driving, it is hardly realis-
tic to believe that fear of the claims aftermath will do so. Among other
reasons for this conclusion is the fact that one does not reach the threshhold
of thinking about the legal consequences of his carelessness until his mind
admits that he is driving carelessly and that he may have an accident. But
people are notoriously optimistic about not becoming accident statistics
themselves, notoriously quick to blame others when an accident occurs, and
notoriously generous in appraising the quality of their own driving. Thus it
is fighting an uphill battle against human nature to base a campaign for
safe driving on the fear of what will happen with reference to insurance
claims.
There is another way in which safety can be promoted by an insurance
claims system, however. The point was forcefully made by the late Richard
Wofrum in his comments upon factors relevant to rate-making. Under
a liability insurance system, he observed, an insurance company is little
interested in whether the car to which its policy applies has safety devices
for the protection of passengers, such as seat belts, a padded dashboard,
and a collapsible steering wheel. This is the case because most of the claim-
ants for whose injuries it pays will be pedestrians or occupants of othcr
cars rather than occupants of the insured car. In contrast, under Basic
Protection, most of the claimants for whose injuries the company would
be obligated to pay would be occupants of the car to which its policy
applied. Thus it would be vitally interested in these safety features, for
35 See text at note 32, supra.
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purposes of both rating and underwriting decisions.3 6 The Basic Protection
system would thus introduce a new economic incentive to encourage safer
design of vehicles.
An insurance claims system cannot be expected in itself to make a very
great contribution to safety. The present system based on negilgence law
and liability insurance does not, and it would be a mistake to assume that
a reformed system would do so either. But to the limited extent that
incentives for safety can be built into a system for compensation, it may well
be that a system under which insurance companies are ordinarily paying
for injuries to occupants of the cars they insure will actually offer signifi-
cantly greater safety incentives than a liability insurance system.
IX. CONTROVERSY OVER DETAILS
Critical discussion of details of the Basic Protection plan has been useful.
Indeed one of the purposes in organizing the study out of which the Basic
Protection proposal emerged was to seek informed criticism of details of
tentative drafts. But discussion of details should not be permitted to divert
those interested in making informed judgments from giving primary
attention to the central problem-the way the system treats the multitude
of small and medium-sized negligence claims-and to the central need for
a system founded on the two basic principles of paying losses up to a moder-
ate limit regardless of fault and doing away with most negligence claims
within a comparable limit.
An example of diversionary arguments frequently used by critics of the
Basic Protection proposal is their assertion that Basic Protection rewards
wrongdoers. In the first place, there is a curious contradiction in defending
liability insurance, as these critics do, and at the same time arguing that
insurance paying non-fault benefits rewards wrongdoers. The very theory of
liability insurance is to provide benefits for wrongdoers-indeed for nobody
but wrongdoers. In other words, by its own theory liability insurance is
designed not to benefit victims but to protect the assets of wrongdoers by
paying claims against them on their behalf. Nor does the contradiction
3 6 See Wolfrum, Discussion of Insurance Cost of Automobile Basic Protection Plan in
Relation to Automobile Bodily Injury Liability Costs, 13 PROCEEDINGS, CAS. ACTUARIAL
Soc'y 164, 173-74 (1966). This paper refers, at 174, to a document, "a comparison
of the characteristics that would be considered under a three-party negligence system
to those in any classification system that I [Wolfrum] believe might well be followed
under a two-party 'related insured' system such as the Basic Protection coverage." The
statements in the text above are based in part on this separate document, copies of
which were available when the paper was delivered at the meeting of the Casualty
Actuarial Society in May, 1966. For further development of the point stated in the
text, see AFTER CARS CRAsH 85-96.
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disappear if one takes the pragmatic view that, whatever its theory may be,
liability insurance is really used more as a system for paying victims than
as a system for protecting tortfeasors' assets. It still is the case that the
funds with which a liability insurance company pays a victim were collected
from thousands of premium payers all but one of whom had even less to
do with causing the victim's injury than the victim himself, however in-
nocent he may have been. Moreover, the vast majority of these premium
payers will have had no connection with any accident during the entire
period for which their premiums purchased coverage. Thus, a liability
insurance system protects the wrongdoer from the economic consequences
of his own wrong with a fund collected from people even more clearly
innocent than the innocent victim. If this is not "rewarding" wrongdoers,
then a fortiori an insurance policy under which a policyholder collects
from his own company, to which he has paid the premium for his own
protection, is not "rewarding" wrongdoing or wrongdoers merely because it
reimburses losses regardless of fault. Under both forms of coverage, in fact,
the payments are not rewards but insurance benefits-paid to reimburse
losses accidentally sustained.
The time has come to make aid to victims of traffic accidents a primary
objective. Moreover, we can wisely choose still to adhere to this objective
even if it sometimes happens incidentally-though no longer as the fulfill-
ment of a primary objective, as under liability insurance-that losses suffered
by wrongdoers are reimbursed. Also, we can do this and still avoid paying
to victims-whether innocent or at fault-real profits such as the present
system allows by permitting overlapping benefits and by encouraging
nuisance settlements for claims of pain and suffering based on negligence.
Let it be clear that all this is not in opposition to merit rating and com-
petitive rating. A system can pay claims to injured victims without regard
to fault and still allow competition and a merit plan that charges higher
rates to bad drivers. The Basic Protection plan can work with or without
competitive and merit rating.37
The example to which critics most often refer in making an argument
about rewarding wrongdoers is the drunken driver. If the objection to
reimbursing losses of drunken drivers is genuine and not simply a debater's
point, the solution is very simple with straightforward insurance coverage
such as Basic Protection, under which a policyholder claims against his own
insurance company rather than some other. Just allow an optional exclusion
for benefits to a person whose conduct such as drunken driving contributed
to his injury. Thus, nobody is forced to pay premiums to cover injuries
37 See text at notes 31-33, supra.
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to somebody else who was guilty of drunken driving, but if a person prefers
to include coverage for himself in case he happens to be involved in an
accident after social drinking, he may pay whatever premium is needed
and have this coverage in his policy. A provision for such an option is
incorporated into the Basic Protection bill filed in Massachusetts for the
1668 session.38
Another example of a criticism of detail that should not be credited as an
argument against the whole Basic Protection plan is the argument that the
$100 deductible provided in the original proposal is unfair to a family of
five, each of whom has medical expenses of about $100 arising from a single
accident, resulting in a total deductible of $500. It is a simple matter to
limit the deductible to $100 per family. Indeed this revision is also incor-
porated in the bill filed in Massachusetts for the 1968 session.39
In fact, criticisms of details of the Basic Protection plan are often ad-
vanced in an effort to defeat the whole plan rather than to show how it
might be improved. Such criticisms should not be permitted to divert
attention from the central need for reform. This is not to oppose discussion
of details, however. Indeed, such discussion is essential. From an early date
in our study-and especially since 1964-we have actively sought candid
criticism of details of drafts out of which the Basic Protection proposal
emerged. We had less success in stimulating such criticism in those early days
than since the Massachusetts House of Representatives passed the Basic Pro-
38 This provision is to be inserted in BPI Act § 2.4, BAsic PROTECTION 309-10. The
revised section will then read in part as follows:
Section 113-2.4. Coverage less than standard prohibited except for optional
deductibles and optional exclusions.-Every insurer writing basic protection insur-
ance within the state shall offer optional exclusions as described in this section, at
appropriately reduced premium rates, and may offer singly or in combination,
and at appropriately reduced premium rates, any of the types of optional deductible
provisions described in this section, in lieu of the standard deductible. With this
exception, insurance providing benefits less in any respect than under standard pro-
visions does not qualify as basic protection insurance....
(c) Optional exclusion of persons committing specified offenses.-Each insurer
shall offer an optional exclusion denying benefits to each injured person, whether
the policyholder or some other person, whose conduct in any of the following
ways contributed to the injury because of which he claims benefits: operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs;
using a motor vehicle without authority knowing that such use is unauthorized;
operating a motor vehicle after suspension or revocation of his license or right
to operate without a license; operating a motor vehicle upon a bet or wager or in
a race; refusal to stop when signaled by a police officer. A person who is disquali-
fied from receiving benefits because of this exclusion in a policy otherwise applying
to his injury is also disqualified from receiving benefits under the assigned claims
plan established pursuant to section 9.1 of this Act.
3 9 This provision is to be inserted in BPI Act § 2.3(a), BAsIc PROTECTION 309. The
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tection bill in August 1967.40 We are grateful for the help these latter-day
criticisms have given us in improving the Basic Protection plan, regardless
of whether this was the result intended by the critics. The amendments just
referred to are examples of the strengthening of the bill as a result of the
debate in Massachusetts. We continue to be receptive to ideas for improve-
ment, and grateful to the critics who advance them, whether friendly or
unfriendly.
X. CONCLUSION
All across the nation, the present system for compensating traffic victims
displays intolerable shortcomings, and the pressure for reform grows more
intense l The need cannot be met without a fundamental change that
attacks the root causes of the system's evils.
A system founded on the two central principles of Basic Protection would
eliminate the wasteful expense of fighting over fault and over the so-called
value of pain and suffering in the multitude of cases based on minor in-
juries. It would render surer and quicker compensation for immediate
out-of-pocket losses. It would render fairer treatment to victims and
motorists alike. It would reduce the incentives to exaggeration and fraud.
And finally, no longer would it be true, as it is today, that even when
everyone in a collision luckily escapes without physical injury, the system
turns a simple accident into a frustrating, time-consuming, unmitigated
nuisance.
The need for reform is already critical, and reform should be tailored
to the distinctive need-avoiding more drastic remedies that still leave the
problems unsolved-preserving private insurance and as much of the
present system as can continue to serve our society well. This is the objective
of the Basic Protection plan.
revised paragraph will then read in part as follows:
(a) Standard deductible.-The greater of the following amounts otherwise
qualifying for reimbursement under this insurance is to be excluded in calculating
benefits to each claimant arising from one accident: (i) the first one hundred
dollars of net loss or (ii) ten per cent of all work loss. Provided, however, that
if two or more persons who are relatives residing in the same household are in-
jured in one accident, the deductible shall be one hundred dollars for all such
persons combined or ten per cent of all work loss, whichever is greater.
40 See, e.g., Boston Globe, August 16, 1967, at 1, 5. The bill was later defeated in the
Senate. See, e.g., Boston Herald-Traveler, Sept. 19, 1967, at 1, 15.
41 See, e.g., The Business with 103 Million Unsatisfied Customers, TriEa, Jan. 26, 1968,
at 20-21; Auto Insurance Reform, CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 1968, at 9-15.
BASIC PROTECTION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLAN
Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell
1 NEW FORM OF COVERAGE-Basic Protection coverage is a new
form of automobile insurance; most of its features, however, are derived
from types of insurance already in use, medical payments coverage of
current policies being the closest analogy.
2. PARTIAL REPLACEMENT OF NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE WITH LOSS INSURANCE-The new coverage partially
replaces negligence liability insurance and its three-party claims procedure
with loss insurance, payable regardless of fault, and a two-party claims
procedure under which ordinarily a victim claims directly against the insui-
ance company of his own car or, if a guest, his host's car or, if a pedestrian,
the car that struck him.
3. EXEMPTION FROM NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY TO SOME
EXTENT-If damages for-pain and suffering would not exceed $5,000 and
other bodily injury damages, principally for out-of-pocket loss, would not
exceed $10,000, an action for Basic Protection benefits replaces any negli-
gence action against an exempt person -(that is, a Basic Protection insured)
for bodily injuries suffered in a traffic accident; in cases of more severe
injury, the negligence action for bodily injuries is preserved, but the recovery
is reduced by these same amounts.
4. BASIC PROTECTION FOR BODILY INJURIES ONLY-Basic
Protection insurance applies to bodily injuries only. Property damage, in-
cluding damage to vehicles, is covered by a separate new form of insurance
called Property Damage Dual Option coverage. (See paragraphs 23-26).
5. BENEFITS NOT BASED ON FAULT-In general, a person who
suffers injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle is entitled to Basic Protection benefits without regard to fault, though
one who intentionally suffers injury does not qualify for benefits.
6. PERIODIC REIMBURSEMENT-Basic Protection benefits are pay-
able month by month as losses accrue, subject to lump-sum payments in
special circumstances.
7. REIMBURSEMENTS LIMITED TO NET LOSS-Basic Protec-
tion benefits are designed to reimburse net out-of-pocket loss only; over-
;lapping with benefits from other sources is avoided by subtracting these
other benefits from gross loss in calculating net loss.
8. LOSS CONSISTS OF EXPENSES AND WORK LOSS-Out-of-
© Copyright by Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell, 1967, and reproduced here
with the permission of the copyright owners. All rights reserved.
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pocket loss for which Basic Protection benefits are payable consists of reason-
able expenses incurred and work loss. Work loss consists of loss of income
from work (for example, wages) and expense reasonably incurred for
services in lieu of those the injured person would have performed without
income. For example, the expenses of hiring household help to do work a
housewife had been doing before being disabled by injury are reimbursable.
9. DEDUCTIBLE LOSSES-The standard deductible of Basic Protec-
tion coverage excludes from reimbursable losses the first $100 of net loss
of all types or 10 per cent of work loss, whichever is greater.
10. STANDARD LIMITS OF LIABILITY-The standard maximum
liability of an insurance company on any Basic Protection policy is $10,000
for injuries to one person in one accident and $100,000 for all injuries in
one accident; an additional limitation prevents liability for payments of
more than $750 for work loss in any one month.
11. OPTIONAL MODIFICATIONS OF COVERAGE; ADDED
PROTECTION BENEFITS-Coverage with the standard limits (see
paragraph 10), exclusion (see paragraph 17), and deductible (see para-
graph 9) is the minimum that qualifies as a Basic Protection coverage except
that larger deductibles, which result in reduced benefits, are offered on an
optional basis at reduced premiums. Policyholders are also offered on an
optional basis enlarged coverage, called Added Protection coverage (see
paragraphs 12 and 13).
12. OPTIONAL ADDED PROTECTION BENEFITS FOR PAIN
AND INCONVENIENCE-Basic Protection benefits are limited to re-
imbursement of out-of-pocket losses and provide no compensation for pain
and suffering; a policyholder may purchase an optional Added Protection
coverage for pain and inconvenience benefits.
13. CATASTROPHE PROTECTION-One optional form of Added
Protection coverage is Catastrophe Protection coverage, which provides
benefits up to $100,000 in addition to Basic Protection benefits.
14. BASIC PROTECTION COVERAGE COMPULSORY-Basic
Protection coverage is compulsory in the sense that this insurance coverage
is a prerequisite to registering or lawfully operating an automobile.
15. AN ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN-Through an assigned claims
plan, Basic Protection benefits are available even when every vehicle in-
volved in an accident is either uninsured or a hit-and-run car.
16. INJURIES INVOLVING NONRESIDENTS-Motoring injuries
that occur within the state enacting the plan and are suffered or caused
by nonresidents are covered by Basic Protection; when no policy in effect
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applies to such injuries, they are handled through what is called an
"assigned claims plan."
17. EXTRATERRITORIAL INJURIES-Motoring injuries suffered
out of state by a person who is an insured, or is a relative residing in the
same household, or is an occupant of a vehicle insured for Basic Protection,
are covered by Basic Protection; except for this provision, no attempt is
made to extend the Basic Protection system to injuries occurring outside
the state enacting it.
18. MULTIPLE POLICIES AND MULTIPLE INJURIES-Provi-
sions are made for allocating and prorating coverage when two or more
policies or two or more injured persons are involved.
19. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES-Special provisions are made for
physical and mental examination of an injured person at the request of an
insurance company and for discovery of facts about the injury, its treatment,
and the victim's earnings before and after -injury.
20. REHABILITATION-Special provisions are made for paying costs
of rehabilitation, including medical treatment and occupational training,
and for imposing sanctions against a claimant when an offer of rehabilitation
is unreasonably refused.
21. CLAIMS AND LITIGATION PROCEDURES-In general the
Basic Protection system preserves present procedures, including jury trial,
for settling and litigating disputed claims based on negligence; modifications
adapt these procedures to the Basic Protection system and particularly to
periodic payment of benefits.
22. RULES APPLICABLE IF A VICTIM DIES-The benefits of
Basic Protection extend to survivors when a motoring injury causes death;
the exemption (see paragraph 3) applies and special provisions treat the
problem of overlapping benefits.
23. PROPERTY DAMAGE DUAL OPTION COVERAGE COM-
PULSORY-Property Damage Dual Option coverage is compulsory in the
sense that this insurance coverage is a prerequisite to registering or lawfully
operating an automobile.
24. COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF OTHERS-
Under the Property Damage Dual Option coverage, each policyholder has
protection against liability for damage that he negligently causes to others
(see paragraph 25).
25. COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO THE POLICYHOLDER'S
VEHICLE-The Property Damage Dual Option coverage can apply also
to damage to the policyholder's own vehicle, and in this respect the policy-
holder has a dual option. If he elects what is termed the "Added Protection
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Option," he is paid for damage to his own car regardless of fault. If he
elects what is termed the "Liability Option," he is paid for damage to his
own car only if he can prove a valid claim based on the negligence of
another person-for example, the other driver in the typical two-car acci-
dent.
26. MOST NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE
ELIMINATED-In order to avoid administrative waste that occurs in
the present system, the new Property Damage Dual Option coverage,
through its system of mutual exemptions, does away with most claims by
which one driver's insurance company, after paying for a loss, tries to
get money back from the other driver's insurance company.
27. THE INSURANCE UNIT AND MARKETING ARRANGE-
MENTS ARE NOT ALTERED-The insurance unit under the Basic
Protection plan is the same as under the present system; ordinarily a policy
will be issued on a vehicle described in the policy to the owner of that
vehicle. It is expected that the new coverage will be marketed in the
same way as automobile negligence liability insurance.
